The transmission of law in pre-literate Iceland has often been viewed as a secular
phenomenon, where the orally-trained lǫgsǫgumaðr [lawspeaker], as the spokesperson of the Icelandic lǫgrétta [Law Council], relied on their traditional legal knowledge in the prosecution of
cases and recitation
of law (G. Sigurðsson 2004; Kjartansson). The role of the lǫgsǫgumaðr in pre-Conversion
and pre-literate Iceland as it is
described in the legal code Grágás in particular, as well as the Íslendingasǫgur, has been viewed as being a secular affair. Not until the movement towards an affiliation
of the lǫgsǫgumenn with the Church in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is the religious sphere thought
to have become a deciding factor (see G. Sigurðsson 2004). Nonetheless, several factors
seem to indicate that this division between the religious
and the secular might not be as clear-cut as previously suggested—especially in tenth
century, pre-Christian Iceland and the North in general (Schjødt 2020a).
The little evidence we have of legal practice connected to the late Viking Age seems
to point firmly in the direction of a connection between the Weberian value spheres (Weber [1920] 1986a) of the religious and the secular, of religion and law (see also
Brink 2003, 2020). Furthermore, while our sources are of course written, it is commonly
assumed that early Nordic laws were orally transmitted for an extended period of time
(Strauch 2011, 3). This is also the case with the earliest Icelandic written examples
of legal material.
In essence, the legal code Grágás is a literary product. The medieval manuscripts that contain the earliest versions
of Grágás are products of a medieval, Christian, Icelandic scribal tradition since both main
manuscripts were produced in the latter half of the thirteenth century (Dennis, Foote,
and Perkins 1980, 13–14). Some parts of Grágás, however, betray traits of orality at various levels, like the more or less obvious
orality of the spoken, early medieval legal procedures (McGlynn), but some instances
may reflect connections to an earlier oral, legal tradition (Brink 2008, 25-28; 2011;
2015, 7-8; Foote 1977a, 1977b, 1987). This is also the case with early Swedish legal
material (Brink 2011) as well as Norwegian examples (Strauch 2011, 109–212).
The transmission of legal material between the earliest known instances of Icelandic
legal material, the semi-mythic Úlfljótslǫg, and the assumed initial codification of law known as Hafliðaskrá in the winter of 1117/1118 (Íslendingabók ch. 10) was thus an oral process in an oral society (Foote 1977a; Kjartansson).
In oral societies, such transmission processes may be characterized as a cultivation
of cultural memory (J. Assmann 2008), which in turn gives us an idea of how the transmission
may have taken place: through
a ritualized performance by a memory specialist (J. Assmann 2006, 39–40; 2008, 114–18;
Nygaard and Schjødt). In the Icelandic context, this specialist was in all likelihood
the lǫgsǫgumaðr,
as has been pointed out by scholars in the past (for instance, Brink 2014; G. Sigurðsson
2018). However, the connection between their recitation of law (see Grágás K20) and ritual and religion has not yet been established explicitly. This will be
the
subject of the present article, which will look first at the connection between law
and religion in pre-Christian Iceland and then at the transmission of the early law
as a cultivation of cultural memory.
Traditionally, the realms of religion on the one hand, and law, politics, and art
on the other, are set apart and dealt with more or less separately by scholars of
the pre-Christian North. This may seem unproblematic, since these topics are indeed understood as separate
in modern-day society, and accordingly scholars classify themselves, for instance,
as either historians of religion or legal historians. Consequently, our sources are seen as sources for either religion or law as well, as representing either the religious or the secular. Many of these sources, however, do not seem to fit so neatly into either category.
From the perspective of the study of religion, this may in fact not be a surprise
or a problem (see also Schjødt 2020a).
Figure 1: Table outlining the Weberian sublimation of Wertsphären.
In his theory of the rationalization and sublimation of Wertsphären, or value spheres, the German sociologist and scholar of religion Max Weber ([1920]
1986a) argues that in societies featuring a religion similar to what Jan Assmann called
primary religion—that is, a type of religion grounded in ritual and primarily transmitted
orally (J. Assmann 2006, 122–26; see also Nygaard and Schjødt; Schjødt 2013)—the
divide between the religious and the secular did not exist. Such societies feature
a more or less “unified” sphere of interrelated societal values (see Fig. 1). According
to Weber, it is not
until the coming of the so-called “sublimierte Erlösungsreligion” [sublimated religion(s)
of salvation] (Weber [1920] 1986a, 542)—Assmann’s secondary religions, which are text-based and
textually canonized (J. Assmann 2006, 122-26; cf. A. Assmann 2008)—that this divide
appears. In this paradigm, as societies slowly develop, tensions
arise within the value spheres and they are differentiated into economic, political
(including legal), aesthetic, erotic, and intellectual value spheres. Consequently,
before this state of “Rationalisierung und bewußte Sublimierung der Beziehungen des
Menschen zu den verschiedenen
Sphären” [rationalization and conscious sublimation of people’s relationship to the
various
spheres (of value)] (Weber [1920] 1986a, 540) it is hard to distinguish between religious
and secular segments of society and their
affiliated roles. Since the pre-Christian Nordic religion of Viking Age Iceland in
all likelihood was a primary religion (Nygaard 2018; ; Nygaard and Schjødt 2018;
Schjødt 2013; see also Steinsland 31–34), the society in which it existed might be
thought to have been governed by the same
lack of differentiation between religious and secular roles. This notion may be exemplified
by the many connections between law and religion in the sources for the pre-Christian
North. As is the case with all Old Norse sources about pre-Christian Iceland (and the rest
of the North for that matter), the Old Norse legal codes were naturally written down
by Christian scribes well after the Christianization of Iceland. This means that the
Christian worldview will have influenced large parts of the source material at hand,
which makes working with this material as a source for pre-Christian law and ritual
a difficult task. Nonetheless, by operating with a model like the one based on the
Weberian value spheres as well as cultural memory studies, it should be possible to
suggest and (re)construct tendencies in the material that correspond to our understanding
of pre-Christian Nordic and Icelandic society (cf. Schjødt 2012, 2013).
A telling example of the pre-Christian Icelandic relationship between law and religion
is the connection that is often made between legal and sacral space (see also, for
instance, Murphy 2018a; Riisøy 2013; Sanmark). Sacral space may be understood as space
that is differentiated from its surroundings
by being assigned a subjective value (of being sacral) by those who use the space
for their religious and ritual practices (Murphy 2016, 144). It is differentiated
by the “religious beliefs and cultural constructions operative within the society
which originally
engendered the spaces” (Murphy 2016, 145). Examples of terms for such places from
the Old Norse textual corpus, which are also
used below, are
helgistaðr and
vé (both “sacral place”). An instance of this ritualization and sacralization of legal
space may be seen
in
Grágás itself, where the lǫgsǫgumaðr is described as having the role of granting people
seats at Lǫgberg:
EN lög sogo maðr a at scipa lögberg oc utlagaz þeir iii. morcom er at olofe hans sitia
þar. Nu bioða menn þav oscil logsogo manne. at láta hann eigi ná seto sini. eþa þa
menn er hann hefir ein nefnda til þess at sitia at lögbergi með ser oc varðar þat
fiorbaugs garð oc scal þat sekia sem aðra þings afglöpon (Grágás 216)
[The Lawspeaker has the right to give people places at Lögberg, and people who sit
there without his leave are fined three marks. If men behave so improperly towards
the Lawspeaker that they do not let him get to his seat, or those men he has individually
named to sit at Lögberg with him, the penalty is lesser outlawry and it is to be prosecuted
like other kinds of assembly balking (SN: lit. obstruction)] (Dennis, Foote, and Perkins
1980, 193)
Not only is it the role of the lawspeaker to give out the places in a seemingly ritualized
(or at least formalized) manner, but he should also fine or prosecute people who misbehave
or hinder him in performing his duties. They break the sacrality of Lǫgberg by ignoring
the subjective value assigned to the space.
This sacralization of the legal space seems to be a common feature in early Scandinavian
law as exemplified by pre-Christian Icelandic and Scandinavian material. Both Old Norwegian provincial laws and narratives about legal space in the Íslendingasǫgur
mention this phenomenon. Eyrbyggja saga ch. 4 recounts how Þórolfr mostrarskegg established his þing-site (heraðsþing) on the point of the headland where he came ashore, which he named Þórsnes due to
Þórr’s apparent role in deciding the location. It is related how the place was “svá
mikill helgistaðr, at hann vildi með engu móti láta saurliga vǫllin” [such a sacred
place that he [Þórólfr] would not let the ground be defiled in any way] (Eygbyggja saga 10). Again, it is paramount that the sacrality of the legal space should not be broken.
The description of Þórólfr’s landnám (land-taking, settlement) in Landnámabók ch. S85, however, relates that following a conflict during a þing-meeting, blood
is spilt on the site making the place óheilagr [unholy, desacralized]. Accordingly, the complex has to be moved further inland because
its subjective value
has been ignored and defiled. Another famous saga-narrative features a similar sacralization
of legal space and following prohibition of violence, that is, of breaking the spatial
sacrality. Egils saga ch. 56 (154–57) relates how Egill Skalla-Grímsson visits the Gulaþing in Western
Norway and sees
the presumed tenth-century practice of erecting vébǫnd (vé-ropes)—a practice also described in the twelfth-century Frostuþingslǫg for Trøndelagen (127; see also Frense 157–76. cf. von See 129–30). The concept vé,
as noted above, is an Old Norse term for a sacral place (see Murphy 2016, 2018a;
also attested in eddic poems like Grímnismál st. 13 and Lokasenna st. 51). In Egils saga, the judges are described as seated inside the vébǫnd and, furthermore, a prohibition
of carrying weapons inside the vébǫnd was in place, presumably to prevent the breaking
of the sacrality. The erection of vébǫnd may also have been practised at the Icelandic
Alþingi if we are to judge from an expression found in Grágás (Murphy 2018a, 36). Here, the absent judges are said to be “um vés úti” [outside
the vé] (Grágás 1974, 76)—at the very least it seems to describe the subjective value of the legal space in
distinctly religious terms. Further connections between legal and ritual space may
be found on the Forsa rune ring from Hälsingland, Sweden (Hs 7, Samnordisk runtextdatabas), the so-called earliest law in Scandinavia (Brink 1996; Bugge). This early Viking
Age inscription concerns the restoration of a vi (ON vé) site
and the fines relating to the failure to do so. This restoration could refer to a
responsibility of periodical maintenance (see Ruthström) or alternatively to a punishment
for breaking the sacrality of the vi-site. In summation,
transgression is forbidden within the sacralized legal space and this, together with
the use of the term vé/vi, or sacral place, in connection with such sites seems to
firmly connect the spheres of law and religion in the pre-Christian North.
The connection between law and religion is further emphasized in the contents of the
fragmentary Úlfljótslǫg, best preserved in the Hauksbók version of Landnámabók ch. 268 (see also Aðalsteinsson 34–36, 158–77). These fragments are the only remaining pieces of the presumed earliest Icelandic
law brought back to Iceland from Western Norway by Úlfljótr. He learnt it there from
his maternal uncle Þorleifr hinn spaki. According to Íslendingabók ch. 2, the law that Úlfljótslǫg is based on was an early version of Gulaþingslǫg, the law of Western Norway in the Viking Age. Furthermore, it is believed that Gulaþingslǫg stems from as early as the ninth century (Strauch 1999, 184; 2011, 114), and, for
Úlfljótr and his uncle to be able to use it as a model, “dass das Gulathingsrecht
in Norwegen damals bereits fest eingeführt war” [that the Gulaþingslǫg already was firmly established in Norway at this time] (Strauch 2011, 114).
The preoccupation shown with the religious sphere in the fragments of Úlfljótslǫg in the Old Norse text is crucial. This fact has also been noted by Jón Hnefill Aðalsteinsson
(158–77), who re-established the fragments handed down to us as examples of genuine
pre-Christian
legal material with a “close relationship … between the law and religion” (Aðalsteinsson
177). In fact, the description of Úlfljótslǫg’s contents is initiated by referring to it as “hinna heiðinu laga” [this pagan law]
(Landnámabók 313). Three main fragments can be identified.
Firstly, there is the article concerning figure heads on ships and the prohibition
against sailing “at landi með gapandi hǫfðunum eða gínandi trjónim, svá at landvættir
fælisk við” [towards the land with gaping heads or yawning snouts, so as to not frighten
the landvættir] (Landnámabók 313). The landvættir, or spirits of the landscape, mentioned here are a rather opaque,
anonymous collective of Otherworldly beings connected to the local landscape (as their
name would imply; see also Óláfs saga Tryggvasonar ch. 33), and their role in the pre-Christian North is not well established. However, they
seem to be connected to the West-Norse area specifically, and do not appear to have
a mythological role, as they are not mentioned in the mythological eddic poems or
in Snorri’s Gylfaginning or Skáldskaparmál (de Vries 1956–57, I: 260–61; Dillmann 327–28). Some limited evidence exists concerning
the practice of food offerings to the landvættir
according to the fourteenth-century Heimslýsing ok helgifræði found in Hauksbók (1892-96, 167). Here the practice of consecrating food to the
landvættir, then eating the food in
order to gain prosperity, is described. If these fragmentary sources are followed, the landvættir thus seem to have a part
in the lived, local religion of a specific area. Furthermore, Jon Hnefill Aðalsteinsson argues that this first article of Úlfljótslǫg could well have originated in the Settlement Era and could have served as a means
to secure a good relationship not merely between the settlers themselves but also
with the Otherworldly beings of the local landscape (163).
Secondly,
Úlfljótslǫg features the description of an oath-ring—an arm ring of precious metal to be worn
during sacral activities, such as oath swearing and sacrifice—, which should be placed
on a
stalli (stone plinth or altar) in the pagan sacral building known as the hof. It is described as follows:
Baugr tvíeyringr eða meiri skyldi liggja í hverju hǫfuðhofi á stalla; þann baug
skyldi hverr goði hafa á hendi sér til lǫgþinga allra, þeira er hann skyldi sjálfr
heyja, ok rjóða hann þar áðr í roðru nautsblóðs þess, er hann blótaði þar sjálfr.
(Landnámabók 313)
[A ring of two-ounce weight or more should lie in each main hof on the stalli;
this ring the goði should have on his arm at all general assemblies, which he himself
had charge of, and he himself should redden it beforehand with the red blood of an
ox, which he himself had sacrificed there. ]
Here, the connection between ritual and law is clearly evident. The oath-ring has
its place in the sacral space of the hof-building, whether this was a separate cultic
building or a sacralized hall. According to
Eyrbyggja saga ch. 4, the goði (who is a prime example of a specialist in both law and religion,
as will be treated below) furthermore had to wear the oath-ring on his arm at all gatherings, presumably because
it was a significant part of his ritual garb (Sundqvist 2007, 27). Before being used
as part of a sacral legal assembly, the goði has to sacralize
it further through reddening it with the blood of an ox presumably sacrificed at the
þing-site itself. Aðalsteinsson argues that the ritual use of the blood-reddened ring in the oath-taking
ceremony was significant because it was meant to draw the attention of the gods to
the legally binding ritual, which would strengthen the contractual binding of those
involved for fear of “the wrath of the gods” (Aðalsteinsson 165; cf. Habbe 140). This indeed highlights the need for religiously supported sacralization in connection
with pre-Christian law.
The second article of
Úlfljótslǫg then goes on to highlight the oathtaking before performing legal business at the
assembly. The oath is of a special character, which is very much connected to the
religious sphere:
Hverr sá maðr, er þar þurfti lǫgskil af hendi at leysa at dómi, skyldi áðr eið vinna
at þeim baugi ok nefna sér vátta tvá eða fleiri. “Nefni ek í þat vætti,” skyldi hann
segja, “at ek vinn eið at bauga, lögeið; hjálpi mér svá Freyr ok Njǫrðr ok hinn almáttki
áss…” (Landnámabók 1968, 313)
[Every man who needed to perform any legal business at the court should first swear
an oath on that ring and name two or more witnesses. “I mention this,” he should say,
“that I swear an oath on the ring, a lawful oath, so help me Freyr, Njǫrðr, and the
all-powerful god…” ]
Some scholars have been critical towards the source value of this passage (see, for
instance, Olsen 34–49; von See 125–28). However, as discussed by, for instance, Aage
Kabell, Jón Hnefill Aðalsteinsson and
more recently Anne Irene Riisøy (2016), the swearing on rings seems to be a genuinely
pre-Christian legal practice (also noted by Olsen 48). This is most likely also the
case for the invoking of the names of Old Nordic gods
(Riisøy 2016). The identity of
hinn almáttki áss has, however, been much discussed and may indeed be a case in point for the possible
Christian influence on our sources noted above. Is it the Christian God, Óðinn, Þórr,
or another Old Norse god more commonly connected with oaths, such as Ullr (cf.
Atlakviða st. 31) or Týr (cf.
Lokasenna st. 38 and Aðalsteinsson 36, 170–74)? Olaf Olsen identifies
hinn almáttki áss with the Christian God, translating the text as the “Almighty God”, thus dismissing
the source value of this passage altogether. Olsen (48–49) argues that the formula must be an altogether Christian invention,
mainly due to
the lack of the idea of divine omnipotence in pre-Christian North. This is a very
reasonable objection. Furthermore, the trio of gods, Olsen argues, invokes the idea of the Holy Trinity,
since the Old Norse gods seldom appear in trios, the most prominent exception being
the trio of gods at Gamla Uppsala in Adam of Bremen’s account (ch. 26). Ritually invoking gods in trios is, however, seen in
Hákonar saga góða ch. 13, where toasts are said to be drunk to “Óðinn … en síðan Njarðar full ok Freys full”
(Óðinn … and thereafter Njǫrðr’s toast and Freyr’s toast) (
Hákonar saga góða 168), suggesting that this trio of gods might have been the one hinted at in
Úlfljótslǫg. If
hinn almáttki áss was originally a pre-Christian god, Óðinn is thus a candidate (see also, for instance,
Turville-Petre 1972, 18). Even if the all-powerful god should be a later Christian addition or substitution
for an older, unknown god, the oath swearing involving rings does seem to be genuinely
pre-Christian (Riisøy 2016, 147–48). Whoever the last god of the oath may be, the
spheres of religion and law seem again
to be intertwined in this the earliest instance of Icelandic law.
Thirdly, Úlfljótslǫg describes the division of the land into four quarters as well as the placement of
hófuðhof (main hof) in each quarter. Each hof has its goði who is supposed to both take care
of the cultic building as well as pass judgements and lead the course of justice at
the þing-assemblies. The source value of this particular section of the law has not
been viewed as on par with the preceding two parts of Úlfljótslǫg, and in all likelihood it is not a product of the tenth century (Aðalsteinsson 177;
see also Olsen 42–45). However, in it, its author(s) have preserved the idea of the
ideal role—or perhaps
memory—of the Icelandic goði as also noted above (see further in, for instance, J.
V. Sigurðsson 1999). This is corroborated by other descriptions of goðar (plural of goði), for instance, Þorólfr in Eyrbyggja saga ch. 3-4 (see also Sundqvist 2007, 24–28). Furthermore, according to the third article
of Úlfljótslǫg in Landnámabók ch. H268 and to Eyrbyggja saga ch. 4, the goði also had the responsibility of collecting hoftollr, a payment to the keeper of the hof. In short, we are dealing with a figure with political, legal, religious, and economic
roles.
As has been shown above, the spheres of what we call law and religion could not be
readily separated in the pre-Christian North based on the brief overview of selected
sources . This also means that the people who dealt with law often also had a role
to play in what could be deemed religious matters. In Úlfljótslǫg, the connections are so strong that it is hard to tell where the religious sphere
ends and the legal begins—or vice versa (see also Aðalsteinsson 177). Following Weber,
this may be explained by the fact that in the pre-Christian North
the distinction was not as clear cut if it indeed was applicable at all. In the case
of the early Icelandic goði, the Weberian value spheres seem truly inseparable. The
lǫgsǫgumenn were chosen from the lǫgrétta, which consisted of 48 goðar and their advisors
(Grágás K117; J. V. Sigurðsson 2001). It would thus seem plausible to argue that as the lǫgsǫgumenn
were also goðar by
definition, the role of the early lǫgsǫgumenn may also have been both legal and religious
because of this double role—not purely secular as has been argued by, for instance,
G. Sigurðsson (2004, 2018).
The lǫgsǫgumenn were also the persons who were responsible for the transmission of
the oral law in pre-Christian Iceland. This process, as noted above, could be designated
as a cultivation of cultural memory, in which the connection between religion and
law seems to be further strengthened.
As noted above, it can be argued that the earliest Icelandic fragments of law, known
as Úlfljótslǫg, are based on legal material from southwestern Norway stemming from as early as the
ninth century (Strauch 1999, 184; 2011, 114). This, in turn, may have rested on an
earlier oral, legal tradition. However, keeping
to the idea of a connection to ninth-century Norwegian oral law means that by the
early tenth century the oral laws of pre-conversion Iceland, brought there from Norway,
could be considered to be cultural memory as envisioned by Aleida and Jan Assmann
(for instance, A. Assmann 1999, 2011; J. Assmann 1988, 2006, 2008, 2011). To be clear,
cultural memory is the form of collective memory that outlasts the
three-generation time span of communicative memory (c. 80-100 years); requires institutionalization and specialized, trained carriers;
and is transmitted in mediated form by these specialists (J. Assmann 2008). It should
come as no surprise that the Icelandic lǫgsǫgumenn would be seen as such
memory specialists (for instance, G. Sigurðsson 2018). These memory specialists were
able to remember and recall large amounts of information
and as such they may be some of the people mentioned in Íslendingabók ch. 1 and 9: the type of person “es langt munði fram” [who could remember a long
way back] (4) or “es bæði vas minnigr ok ólyginn” [who had both a reliable memory
and was truthful] (21; see also Hermann 2020). From a legal perspective such “treasurers
of cultural memory” (Brink 2014, 198), as Stefan Brink has termed them, may also be
found in the Swedish minnunga mæn (Brink 2014). This description as cultural memory bearers arguably also applies
to the lǫgsǫgumenn.
As noted above, the early lǫgsǫgumaðr has traditionally been seen as a secular figure
juxtaposing him with the later lawspeakers who were often connected to the church.
Gísli Sigurðsson (2004), for instance, has argued that the focal point of the power
of the lǫgsǫgumenn shifted
from the secular to the religious in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries—that is,
from their oral abilities and training to an association with the medieval Church
and law-books. However, as I have aimed to show above, this distinction between the
religious and the secular does not seem to be appropriate in the general legal and
cultural context of pre-conversion Iceland. Looking at the descriptions concerning
two specific early lǫgsǫgumenn seems to further corroborate this notion. That is,
in addition to their function as memory specialists, which has been noted above, they
also seem to have religious, ritual responsibilities. These many roles may stem from
the fact that the lǫgsǫgumenn were also goðar as noted briefly above. The multifunctionality
of the goði and thus also of the lǫgsǫgumaðr with its blend of religious, ritual,
legal, and political competencies is the focus of the following sections, which investigate
the two last lǫgsǫgumenn of the tenth century, according to
Íslendingabók ch. 5: Þorkell
máni, lǫgsǫgumaðr from 970-84, and Þorgeirr Ljósvetningagóði, lǫgsǫgumaðr from 985-1001
(G. Sigurðsson 2004, 66–67). What follows is an analysis of the descriptions of these
two individuals and their
doings found mainly in
Íslendingabók and
Landnámabók. The description of Þorkell máni given in
Landnámabók is as follows:
Sonr Þorsteins var Þorkell máni lǫgsǫgumaðr, er einn heiðinna manna hefir bezt verit
siðaðr, at því er menn vitu dœmi til. Hann lét sik bera í sólargeisla í banasótt sinni
ok fal sik á hendi þeim guði, er sólina hafði skapat; hafði hann ok lifat svá hreinliga
sem þeir kristnir menn, er bezt eru siðaðir. (Landnámabók 1968, 46)
[Þorsteinn’s son was Þorkell máni, the lǫgsǫgumaðr, who was one of the best heathen
men who ever lived as far as anyone can tell. He let himself be carried into the sunlight
when fatally ill, and handed himself over to the God who had created the sun; he had
lived as pure a life as the best of Christian men. ]
In this description, as it is transmitted both in the Sturlubók and Hauksbók versions
of
Landnamabók as well as in
Óláfs saga Tryggvasonar, two things are highlighted: the fact that Þorkell had been a lǫgsǫgumaðr and his
religion. The style of
Landnámabók in general betrays a preoccupation with the “details of common life” (Pálsson and
Edwards 12), and religion does not seem to be the primary concern of the author(s)
of this genealogical
account. However, the lǫgsǫgumaðr Þorkell máni is described as a pagan. He was the
noblest of pagans, and he led as pure a life as the best of Christians—ultimately,
converting on his deathbed. Why include these two specific elements connected to law
and religion in this description? The answer may lie in the fact that these two concepts
were intrinsically intertwined in the Settlement Era. This is even clearer in the
chief narrative about the most famous early lǫgsǫgumaðr, Þorgeirr Ljósvetningagóði.
The conversion of Iceland in 999/1000 and the Christianization efforts of the preceding
years described in Íslendingabók ch. 7 are probably known to most readers. Following a somewhat failed attempt to convert
the Icelandic population by the missionary Þangbrandr, King Óláfr Tryggvason receives
promises of help with the Christianization from the Christianized chieftains Gizurr
hinn hvíti, Hjalti Skeggjason, and Hallr á Síðu. Ultimately, after some conflict at
the Alþingi, the Christian Icelanders ask Hallr á Siðu to recite the Christian law,
but he agrees with the pagan lǫgsǫgumaðr Þorgeirr that Þorgeirr should speak it. Þorgeirr
then famously goes “under the cloak” (cf. Aðalsteinsson), retreating from the outside
world for an entire day and night. What happened under
that cloak has been discussed at length—a discussion that is summarized very thoroughly
by Aðalsteinsson. When Þorgeirr ultimately announces his recommendation to the Alþingi, it is difficult
to argue that he acts as a ritual and memory specialist. His announcement does take
place from the presumably sacralized space of Lǫgberg, but it does not necessarily
constitute an instance of the cultivation of cultural memory through ritual, periodical
transmission (see below). However, Þorgeirr was also a goði with ritual and religious
capacities, as noted above, and in preparation for making his announcement he may
have used his knowledge of and connection to the Other World when under the cloak
(see also, for instance, de Vries 1958; Frog 2019, 279–81; Aðalsteinsson 103–04).
Aðalsteinsson contends that Þorgeirr’s speech has long been given too much attention
in the research on the conversion narrative, and that instead the ritual of going
under the cloak must be paid more heed. Following a comparison with other saga sources
as well as sources concerning Lapp, Northern Norwegian, and Irish traditions, Aðalsteinsson
concludes “that Þorgeir did not stay under the cloak to think but to carry out an
ancient soothsaying
ritual” (123). He thus connects Þorgeirr’s actions with the composition of poetry,
divination,
the practice of seiðr, as well as shamanism. What all these quite different phenomena have in common is
a connection to the numinous and the Other World. Jan de Vries (1958) holds that
Þorgeirr lay on the ground under his cloak in order to communicate with
the vættir, also mentioned above, and that “[w]enn ein solcher Mann sich in dieser feierlichen
Weise auf den Boden legt, so wussten
Sie, dass es eine frétt war” [when such a man lays down on the ground in such a solemn manner, then they
[the people
attending the þing] knew that is was a frétt] (82). That is, people knew that he was
asking the gods or Otherworldly beings for advice
on what to do in this very difficult situation. Frog (2019, 281) mentions Þorgeirr’s
covering himself as a part of a common theme of covering oneself
while going into trance in shamanistic rituals across Northern Europe. Frog thus categorizes
this ritual as shamanistic and at the same time not connected to Finns or Sámi peoples
as shamanistic practices often are in the Old Norse texts. In her response to Frog’s
article, Margaret Clunies Ross rightly notes that the contention that Þorgeirr’s ritual
actions should be seen as shamanistic has not been readily accepted in the scholarship
(301). Ultimately, both Aðalsteinsson, Frog, and de Vries argue in differing ways
that
Þorgeirr thus seeks and gets numinous advice in this ritual involving the cloak and
further that this was known by those present at the Alþingi.
According to Kristni saga ch. 12, Hallr á Siðu pays Þorgeirr Ljósvetningsgóði money to recite both the pagan
and the Christian laws. This is also related in Njáls saga (271) and Óláfs saga Tryggvasonar in mesta (1958-2000: II, 191), although the amount differs in the three accounts (see also
Grønlie 25, fn. 71). The underlying assumption seems to be that Þorgeirr was bribed
in order to make
his decision in favour of the Christians (Ólsen 1900: 86; Jóhannesson 1974, 134–5;
this interpretation has, however, been contested ). Whatever Þorgeirr’s motives might have been, from a ritual studies perspective
it is not crucial whether or not he received payment. What matters in a ritual is
not motivation, but whether or not the ritual is properly performed by a ritual specialist
(Rappaport 114). Þorgeirr performed the ritual underneath the cloak, and being a goði
we can assume
that he did so following the appropriate ritual conventions: this is what matters,
not his personal motives.
After reaching his decision using and relying on his ritual and religious knowledge
and skill and perhaps following advice from the Other World, Þorgeirr calls together
people at Lǫgberg where he gives his speech voicing his concern that a civil war will
break out if the Icelanders cannot have the same law. He refers to how Norway and
Denmark have enjoyed peace ever since both countries converted to Christianity. Then
Þorgeirr says:
“En nú þykkir mér þat ráð,” kvað hann, “at vér látim ok eigi þá ráða, es mest vilja
í gegn gangask, ok miðlum svá mál á milli þeira, at hvárirtveggju hafi nakkvat síns
máls, ok hǫfum allir ein lǫg ok einn sið. Þat mun verða satt, er vér slítum í sundr
lǫgin, at vér monum slíta ok friðinn.” … Þá vas þat mælt í lǫgum … en of barnaútburð
skyldu standa in fornu lǫg ok of hrossakjötsát. Skyldu menn blóta a laun. (Íslendingabók 17)
[“And it now seems advisable to me,” he said, “that we too do not let those who most
wish to oppose each other prevail, and let us arbitrate between them, so that each
side has its own way in something, and let us all have the same law and the same religion.
It will prove true that if we tear apart the law, we will also tear apart the peace.”
… It was then proclaimed in the laws that all people should be Christian … but the
old laws should stand as regards the exposure of children and the eating of horse-flesh.
People had the right to sacrifice in secret.] (Grønlie 9)
The key part here is the phrase
ok hǫfum allir ein lǫg ok einn sið. This emphasizes the notion that the law (
lǫg) and religion (
siðr, lit. tradition) are intertwined and hard to separate. In fact, they seem to depend on each other.
A change in religion means a new law built on this new religion. Presumably, this
means that the old law (
forn lǫg) was built on the old, pre-Christian religion. This is indicated by the fact that
important aspects of the pre-Christian Nordic religion such as the eating of horse
flesh are kept in the new law as well as by the compromise stipulating that pagans
were allowed to sacrifice in secret, presumably among themselves and indoors (de
Vries 1958, 82). Additionally, if the old law in any way resembled the fragments of
Úlfljótslǫg discussed above, this contention seems to be supported further. As shown above,
Úlfljótslǫg as it has come down to us in
Landnámabók ch. H268 is so preoccupied with religion and ritual that it is difficult to separate
the spheres of law and religion in the preserved text. This seems to indicate that
while law and religion were naturally not exactly the same thing, they were so interrelated
in pre-Christian Icelandic culture that both spheres must have been a part of the
role of the early lǫgsǫgumenn. Part of this complex field was in all likelihood also
the transmission of early oral law. In the following, it will be argued that viewing
this transmission process as a ritualized cultivation of cultural memory may give
an idea of how the transmission might have taken place, thus further expanding on
the probable ritual role of the lǫgsǫgumaðr.
That the transmission of law in pre-conversion, pre-literate Iceland, as well as the
rest of the North, was oral can hardly be questioned (Foote 1977a, 1977b; Kjartansson;
McGlynn; Strauch 2011, 3). What can, however, be questioned is the form this transmission
took. In the medieval
Icelandic law code
Grágás we find a description of the process of periodical recital of the entire Icelandic
law by the lǫgsǫgumaðr, conducted over the course of three summers at the Alþingi
meetings. This process has generally been thought to more or less reflect the process
of oral transmission of law in Iceland in the Viking and early Middle Ages (Dennis,
Foote, and Perkins 1980, 12–13). However, in his 2009 article “Law Recital According
to Old Icelandic Law,” Helgi Skúli Kjartansson doubts the relevance of what he calls
the “reiterative law recital” (100) as a tool for transmission of law by lǫgsǫgumenn
in a pre-literate Viking Age, Icelandic
context. Such periodic recital of the entire law sees no parallels in other Germanic
legal traditions and may have been a short-lived, eleventh-century Icelandic practice
providing an alternative to codified law. Kjartansson writes:
Rather, it may have been an isolated Icelandic experiment, commencing perhaps either
shortly before or after the codification effort of 1117-1118, both initiatives reflecting
the same motivation to modernise and standardise the country’s law (100)
He thus favours the private, one-on-one tutoring of the master-apprentice relationship
as the staple of pre-literate lǫgsǫgumaðr training and education in Iceland, presumably
akin to the scenario described in the well-known chapter 57 of
Færeyinga saga. Here, a nine-year-old apprentice is instructed in legal tradition by an older legal
expert. When asked what the boy had learned from his master, Þrándr, “hann kvezk numit
hafa allar saksóknir at sœkja ok réttarfar sitt ok annarra; lá honum
þat greitt fyrir” [he said that he had learnt all about prosecuting lawsuits and his
own legal rights
and those of others; he [Þrándr] had made it available to him] (
Færeyinga saga 115). This form of training was no doubt integral to the process of oral transmission
of law, but it may only convey part of the story. In the terms of Jan and Aleida Assmann,
the cultivation of legal material in the Viking Age and early Middle Ages would constitute
a part of cultural memory cultivation (J. Assmann 1988, 2008). Cultural memory, as
noted above, firstly implies institutionalization, meaning that
it “requires institutions of preservation” (J. Assmann 2008, 111) in order to survive.
Otherwise, the material would be forgotten. Secondly, cultural memory requires specialized carriers of memory or memory specialists
who form the group that make up the institution of preservation (J. Assmann 2008,
114; see also Brink 2014; G. Sigurðsson 2018). Here, the master-apprentice relationship
that Kjartansson favours is key, since
it constitutes a way in which the cultural memory can be passed on between individuals
and where a memory specialist can be formally trained. Thirdly, cultural memory is
social and collective and needs to be communicated to the group in order to exist.
As Pernille Hermann has put it, “due to its social and communicative components, cultural
memory is not thought to
be something that is inside individuals; rather, it exists between individuals” (Hermann
2009, 288). That is, for pre-literate law to exist and be useful outside the master-apprentice
relationship it must be communicated publicly to the wider group. Naturally, the lǫgrétta
is a collective, they were the institution of preservation, but the people of the
Alþingi were not all part of this group. They also needed a way to access their legal
cultural memory in order to act according to it. The question then remains how this
might have been done.
Jan Assmann’s ideas of transmission of cultural memory in oral cultures highlight
the need in such cultures for ritualized, collective transmission (J. Assmann 2006,
39–40, 2008; 114–18; Nygaard and Schjødt). It may be argued that the periodical performance
of legal material by a memory specialist
such as the lǫgsǫgumaðr as described in the medieval Icelandic sources would be an
entirely appropriate mode of public, collective communication in a pre-literate, Viking
Age Icelandic society.
Kjartansson’s contention that the periodical, reiterative recital of law described
in Grágás should not be seen as a relevant form of transmission of law in the pre-Christian,
pre-literate Viking Age context could thus be reassessed—on theoretical grounds at
least—if the cultivation of law in Viking Age Iceland is viewed as a ritualized cultivation
of cultural memory. Working with this theoretical memory studies model would seem
to grant us the possibility for this reassessment. Furthermore, it would fit well
with the relationship between law and religion described above. The periodical, reiterative
recital of law would then be the official, public, collective reconstruction of (legal)
cultural memory where the old traditions are refreshed in the minds of the Alþingi
attendants and where new laws were also introduced.
In the section of the
Grágás called
lǫgsǫgumannsþáttr [The Law Speaker’s Section], the role of the lǫgsǫgumaðr is described: he had to
recite the
þingskǫp (Assembly Procedure) each summer; give advice in interpretations of the law; allocate
seats at Lǫgberg; and announce the decisions of the lǫgrétta. The primary responsibility,
however, seems to have been to recite the law,
at segia up lǫg, a third every summer so that he got through it in its entirety at least once during
his three-year term. What this entirety may have been in pre-conversion Iceland, is
of course difficult to tell. As scholarship on orality has long since established,
oral cultures and their traditions are based on a different notion of both stability
and fluidity and feature different models of, for instance, verbatim recollection
(Foley 1991, 2002). For example, a “word” was not necessarily the same in an oral,
Icelandic context as it is to us modern
consumers of written text, but, following John Miles Foley, could more productively
be seen as meaningful units of utterance ranging from formulae to stock scenes (Foley
2002; see also Frog 2014, 2016). This means that while the oral law was no doubt structured
around stable central
concepts and themes, considerable room for adaptation and variation-within-limits
in all likelihood existed in the individual performances by the lǫgsǫgumenn. Nonetheless,
the relevant part of
lǫgsǫgumannsþáttr reads:
Sva er en mælt at sa maðr scal vera nockor auallt a lanðe óro er scyldr se til þess
at segia log monnom. oc heitir sa lögsogo maðr … Þat er oc mælt at lögsögo maðr er
scylldr til þess at segia up lög þátto alla þrimr sumrom hueriom. en þingscop huert
sumar … Þat er oc at logsogo maðr scal sva gerla þátto alla up segia at engi vite
eina miclogi ger. (Grágás 1974, 208–09)
[It is also prescribed that there shall always be some man in our country who is required
to tell men the law, and he is called the Lawspeaker … It is also prescribed that
a Lawspeaker is required to recite all the sections of the law over three summers
and the assembly procedure every summer … It is also prescribed that the Lawspeaker
shall recite all the sections so extensively that no one knows them much more extensively.]
(Dennis, Foote, and Perkins 1980, 187–88)
This means that we are dealing with a person, who—at least in pre-literate Iceland—had
to recite the law from memory, that is, perform it (Rigney 217; cf. Schechner). This
is, moreover, done in the presence of the institution of memory specialists
from which the lǫgsǫgumaðr is chosen (
Grágás K116–117; see J. V. Sigurðsson 2001): the collective of the lǫgrétta [Law Council]
along with the rest of the attendants at the Alþingi. This generally corresponds
with the structure of transmission of cultural memory in oral societies proposed by
Jan Assmann (for instance, 2006, 39). This tripartite structure must include processes
of 1)
preservation; 2)
retrieval; and 3)
communication, which for Assmann entails
poetic form as a mnemonic tool;
ritual performance in the form of a complex context consisting of, among other things “voice, body,
mime, gesture … and ritual action” (J. Assmann 2006, 39); and
collective participation achieved through coming together and being personally present at collective assemblies
(J. Assmann 2006, 39–41). In the case of the periodical recital of law in pre-conversion
Iceland, it seems
that the communication through collective participation at an assembly is almost obvious,
since this was the whole point of the
upp segia of the lǫgsǫgumaðr at Lǫgberg. The remaining two functions may not seem readily apparent
in the material and will thus be discussed further.
Concerning the first function,
preservation, the legal material in pre-Conversion Iceland seems to have been preserved through
a preoccupation with formalization. This is highlighted by the work of scholars of
early Nordic law on the orality of this legal tradition, who point to it having relied
to some extent on formalized, formulaic language (for instance, Brink 2005, 2011).
Such formalization and memorization for the sake of stability, it can be argued,
is at the core of Assmann’s considerations of the
function of preservation (J. Assmann 2008, 114–15). While Jan Assmann favours poetic form
as the main form of preservation of cultural
memory in oral cultures, such processes are naturally culturally specific to the oral
tradition in which it originates. Furthermore, oral poetic form may be many things
and does not necessarily take the form of Western poetry that many have come to expect
(see Foley 2002). This means that we might be hard-pressed to find recognizable poetic
form at the
heart of the preservation of early law in pre-conversion Iceland—something else may
be at stake. This is also indicated by earlier research into, for instance, the poetic
and alliterative quality of early Icelandic law. Peter Foote (1987) has argued that
the laws were memorized by the lǫgsǫgumenn in spite of the apparent
lack of poetic qualities. Foote notes that memorization in Viking Age Iceland was
very different to modern-day parallels and would have been much more akin to practices
by medieval monks. He writes:
The matter was indeed chewed and digested, pondered and assimilated. What would remain
longest and widest in verbal memory would doubtless be the procedural forms which
any householder might require, publishing a suit, naming witnesses, summoning neighbours,
challenging panels, delivering a dependent, betrothing a daughter, and so on. (Foote
1987, 56)
These areas highlighted by Foote are precisely where we find some of the admittedly
very sporadic evidence of formulaic language in
Grágás. Following the work of Michael P. McGlynn, examples of this memorization process
for the naming of witnesses may be found at work in the form of formulaic expression
and phrases in the section of
Grágás called
Þingskapaþáttr (Assembly Procedures Section, K20-85). One pertinent example is the formulae
nefna þena þegn. This “ritual utterance” (McGlynn 531) was supposed to be said by a chieftain when
he nominated a judge: “ec nefni þena þegn i dóm. oc nefna hin a nafn” [I nominate
this good man and true to join the court — and name him by name] (
Grágás 39; Dennis, Foote, and Perkins 1980, 54). According to McGlynn, the use of
þegn in the first pair of alliterating words as a metonymic word referring to a good and
true citizen rather than to a thane specifically points toward this word-pair being
an oral formula preserving an archaic style (531–32). The second pair of alliterating words
oc nefna hin a nafn, may then be a specific legal formula used to prevent the usage of nicknames or other
imprecise ways of referring to the candidates.
A second alliterative formulaic expression, which was seemingly known across Scandinavia
(Foote 1987), is arinn ok eldr [hearth and fire]. It can be found in the section called réttr leiglenðings in Landabrigðisþáttr of Grágás (K219), as well as in both the Norwegian Frostuþingslǫg, and Swedish Östgötalagen (Foote 1987, 55), where it is thought to appear with the same symbolic meaning
(Ehrhardt 179, 180)—although, as Foote notes, the contexts of the three cases are
not the same (Foote 1987, 55). The context in Landabrigðisþáttr is the prohibition of subletting land with the penalty of lesser outlawry for both
the original tenant and the subletter who “arne ok ellde fór a land hans at oleyfe
hans” [moved hearth and fire onto the owners land without his leave] (Grágás 136; Dennis, Foote, and Perkins 2000, 150). This means that we are again firmly in
the domain suggested by Foote as most likely
to remain in verbal memory and perhaps also to contain formulaic, poetic language:
that is, the realm of “procedural forms which any householder might require, [e.g.
for] publishing a suit” (Foote 1987, 56). Thus, while this may seem to be very little evidence indeed of poetic, formulaic
language of possible oral law having been carried over into the thirteenth century
recording of Grágás, it does seem to indicate that this may have been a part of the oral transmission
process.
The second function of Assmann’s structure, the retrieval through ritual performance,
can be seen in the descriptions of the recital found in lǫgsǫgumannsþáttr: an act that is heavily ritualized. Taking a point of departure in Roy A. Rappaport’s
definition of ritual acts, as “the performance of more or less invariant sequences
of formal acts and utterances
not entirely encoded by the performers” (Rappaport 24), this description of ritual
acts may also be said to encompass the recital of law
by the lǫgsǫgumaðr. Firstly, the time and space of the recital—or performance—is set
off from normal everyday life (Rappaport 37–46); it has been sacralized, as argued
above. The invariance of the recital is stipulated
in lǫgsǫgumannsþáttr, which notes that the legal knowledge of the lǫgsǫgumaðr should be so extensive “that
no one knows them much more extensively” (Dennis, Foote, and Perkins 1980, 188).
The legal oral formulae, as noted above, as well as the stipulation that the recital
is to take place every year at the same time (Grágás K116) and include the entire law (see, however, above; Grágás K19) would secure the formalization of the recital by the lǫgsǫgumaðr by building
on “conformity to form, repetitiveness, regularity, and stylization” (Rappaport 46).
The contents are likewise something fit for such ritual performance. Keeping in
mind the characteristics of cultural memory noted above, the legal material cultivated
orally over more than a century belongs to a tradition entrusted to a select few,
initiated, specialized carriers who were the bearers of cultural memory (cf. Brink
2014, 198)—the contents of the law are not encoded entirely by the performing lǫgsǫgumaðr.
All in all, the act of periodical recital of law by the lǫgsǫgumaðr can be argued
to have been a ritualized cultivation of cultural memory, and as such it is entirely
appropriate as a form of transmission of collective legal tradition in an oral society.
The contents of the early legal material treated in this article show such an intricate
connection with religious knowledge and ritual action that the role of religion can
be said to have been crucial in the process of transmission of oral, legal knowledge
in pre-Christian Iceland. This points towards the fact that the Weberian value spheres
of the religious and the secular were very much intertwined in pre-conversion Iceland.
Together with the fact that the lǫgsǫgumaðr was also a goði with inherently ritual
responsibilities and religious knowledge (as also seen in Íslendingabók ch. 7’s description of Þorgeirr Ljósvetningagóði), this furthermore points towards
the role of the pre-Christian lǫgsǫgumenn being
both religious and secular specialists, not purely secular, as has hitherto been argued.
This suggests that through their role as memory specialists they were able to not
only draw on legal knowledge but also on religious information and ritual skills in
their transmission of early law as a cultivation of cultural memory.